

CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITIES AMONG YOUTH IN COUNTRIES OF ASIA-PACIFIC



Report for UNESCO Bangkok | October 2016

By Christian Dohrmann

Contents

- I. Introduction 2
- 1. Summary of Findings..... 3
- 2. Detailed Analysis..... 6
 - 2.1 Political Participation means Community Involvement..... 6
 - 2.2 Civic Knowledge is Present..... 9
 - 2.3 A Relation with the Government 10
 - 2.4 The Role of Law 10
 - 2.5 Behaving Morally, or Not 11
 - 2.6 Obedience and the Self..... 12
 - 2.7 Global Values and Expectations on Society 14
 - 2.8 No Social Trust 15
 - 2.9 Irresponsibility or Unconsciousness 15
 - 2.10 Cultural Appreciation and a Sense of Identity 16
- 3. Theoretical Underpinnings of Citizen Identities 17
- 4. Citizenship and Identity 18
- II. Bibliography 22
- III. Annex 24

I. Introduction

For this report, the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2009 will find most application. The ICCS study, although from 2009, measured student perceptions and behaviours relevant to citizenship values. This study appears to be the most relevant, because of its rich survey on youths' interpretation of citizenship and associated behaviours, beliefs and attitudes. Many studies on citizenship that were undertaken by individual authors also refer to the ICCS 2009, whereas they re-interpret its data instead of creating new surveys. While the ICCS 2009 is rich in tables, and also experienced global application, it is short in countries relevant for this report. The Asian report of the ICCS only refers to Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan (Taipei only) and China (Hong Kong only). Nevertheless, it provides insights into societies of different backgrounds and state of economic progress.

Survey data from the Asian Barometer will also find application in this report. The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) investigates the political and social dimension of societies in East and South East Asia. Most data reference comes from the UNDP report on Youth and Democratic Citizenship in East and South-East Asia (2014a) because it compiled most applicable data into one comprehensive document with relevance to this present report. The UNDP report on youth and democratic citizenship occasionally provides additional or contrasting content for interpretation.

Further studies are included as they were accessible during the preliminary literature research to add additional information on youth's beliefs and behaviour. These studies will find mention throughout the report.

The report will open with a summary of findings to quickly introduce a picture of the identified elements regarding citizenship and identity. The following sections will explain where certain interpretations derived from, while providing the relevant statistical detail. The original statistical tables, with some minor exceptions, have been copied and included in the annex for reference. Finally, the conclusion will attempt aligning interpretations on citizenship as proposed by other authors.

1. Summary of Findings

During this analysis it has become indicative that young people have a strong awareness of their duty as a citizen when it comes to political participation. The reason for why young people engage at all does not appear to be duty-oriented. Even though they have the awareness of their political duty, they may not necessarily exercise it; and if they do, they appear to do it for personal reasons. They may not all nor generally exercise traditional political participation options, such as voting, but they showed that they are highly aware of their citizenship duty to vote. Whether this duty is a societal expectation or their own norm of behaviour is another question open for analysis. But further findings indicate a discrepancy between what a young person or young citizen should do and wants to do and actually does.

To continue, it has been shown that most of youth are interested in political developments and follow up on political news, even though not each and every one would do so. But this suggests that youth are indeed interested in political affairs, although it is often lamented that youth would lack interest. In general, though, their attitude towards political affairs displays a tendency of uncertainty. The youth populations seem split regarding whether they want to or should join a political party. What shines through, though, youth are not the partisan type of citizen.

Youth also appear to disassociate from what is understood under the term of politics, and associate negative experiences or interpretations with this term. This may offer one reason for the hesitation regarding being involved in politics. The tendency of being uncertain about political involvement, however, has led to realising that youth apparently prefer to be involved on the community level. This will most likely represent their next sphere of association and, therewith, citizenship identity.

Dealing with community needs and the needs of the people in a practical manner and directly appears to be the defining form of their 'political' citizenship among young people – and likely future adults. Furthermore, looking at the political/community dimension has pointed out the discrepancy between 'should' and 'do', between awareness and execution of citizenship values.

Another notion that may have come to light is that young people appear not be willing to concern themselves with national political affairs when their most basic needs are not met. This may also be a reason why young people rather engage in communal affairs in order to improve matters at hand which yield an immediate benefit, potentially also for themselves.

Young people appear to value a close relationship with their governments. They expect that the government acts like a parent and takes care of the population as if it were their children. This perception shifts the responsibility for the nation from the people level to the governmental, leaving the notion of having expectations on their governments equally to carry out the responsibilities towards the nation. Young people's citizenship, therefore, is not only about realising their own duties or responsibilities, but seemingly also about having expectations on the duties and responsibilities among those who govern.

The high expectations on their governments are likely to be supported by high pride in the government system. Having high expectations on and high pride in the government at the same time may indicate satisfaction with the way young people feel are governed. The South Korean student populations have made it indicative: when not fulfilling their expectations, they will offer little positive criticism about their government. Similar indirect criticism can be read from young Singaporeans (Ho et al 2011) who stated that as long as they are being given the material goods by the government, they are quite happy; they "will shut up" (ebd. 270). However, this open criticism may mostly account for countries that have achieved a certain degree of economic prosperity and freedom of speech.

It may also be argued that high pride combined with high expectations in the government may likely yield a nationally committed citizen due to relating to the government – as opposed to a communal citizen due to a missing governmental relation.

The role of the law is most likely to shape a young person's citizen attitude and behaviour. Law-abidingness found frequent high if not the highest emphasis when it comes to citizenry-related attributes. *If* these young people were indeed to exercise as much lawfulness as they display to value, the future Asia-Pacific region may be defined by a highly lawful citizenry.

In relation to being lawful, moral mostly tends to be a commonly shared citizenship value. But even though the majority of South Koreans indicate this same shared value, they also show a deviant attitude; one which leaves to interpret whether South Koreans have an alternative interpretation of a good citizen. It leaves to wonder if that difference compared to other societies is linked to their competition-oriented education and/or society.

Despite the agreement to moral behaviour, it has also been discovered that Thai and Indonesian students support non-moral behaviour, in addition to a tendency for traditional paternalist and communalist values. Especially Thai students would support corruption-related behaviour in their society. This shows again a discrepancy between the 'should' and 'do' regarding exercising citizenship values. Even though these students know about the expected good-citizen value, they do not exercise it when it comes to real life. The other alternative is: they do not understand the implications of their actions – or missing actions.

Obedience has proven to be an Asia-Pacific dividing value. While students from countries of South and South East Asia tend to support following elders or people in higher social positions as well as parents, young people from East Asia may not necessarily support this value. Once more, South Koreans are the ones standing out here, showing the least support for following others. Nevertheless, blindly following older generations was also rejected by Cambodians. While in South Korea the progressing emphasis on individuality may be the culprit for rejecting following upward orientation, in Cambodia it may be the common dissatisfaction with perceived corruption among the adult generations.

Furthermore, a statistically significant gender difference appears for young Koreans: young males are more likely to follow elders, parents and people in higher social positions than females would.

Support for environmental protection, human rights and the progress on democracy in the region has been identified as commonly agreed values, suggesting that youth in Asia-Pacific are aware of the value of these elements and likely to support actions to foster them in the region. When it comes to protesting, however, the students were not as supportive, although the majority still indicated to protest in the case of unfair laws. Given the difference in support of environmental or human rights activities, protesting does not spark the same high appreciation – to the relief to some societies, one might expect.

Furthermore, young people also value good governance and social equity before norms aimed a governmental control or their freedom and liberty. The value that comes out of having a greater preference for good governance and social equity is that young people, again, display the expectation to have their basic needs met first, before being concerned with matters of the ruling system and even their own freedom.

Moreover, democracy found high support even in countries which are virtually governed by one party only, such as China, Viet Nam and Singapore. This finding suggests that young people interpret 'democratic' not just as a political concept but perhaps as a means of social inclusion. Ho et al (2011) remarked that some Singaporean students in their study of citizenship education interpreted democracy as "participatory and social justice-oriented" (ebd.: 272). The only notion of a political element regarding

the term democracy was mentioned with voting. If that was so, future citizens of Asia-Pacific may exercise democracy in their everyday lives instead of just a means of political participation.

Further exploring young people's civic behaviour, the impression has arisen that they may have a propensity towards delegating responsibilities away. In particular, the common agreement on "corruption is adults' business and has nothing to do with young people" accentuates this notion. The missing consciousness for responsibility may interlink with the discrepancy between awareness and execution of a certain behaviour, if not with a missing understanding of their own behaviours.

Social trust has been found to be very low among youth, especially among young Burmese and Cambodians, while Chinese experience the highest social trust. Little social trust will certainly impact on forming a common identity on all levels from community to international levels in the future. Without trust, how would cooperation be established?

Last but not least, cultural origin as well as cultural conservation has been seen to be very relevant to young people in the region. Especially young Indonesians and Thai had the highest scores for learning about their history. Remarkable is also the common agreement to protecting one's own culture against the influences of other cultures. A struggle for maintaining an identity may be at hand. The question is whether this struggle for an identity is based on ethnic differences. For Taiwan, at least, it was found that young Taiwanese identify with the people living in their environment, while not necessarily distinguishing whether one person belongs to another ethnicity. Even an identity with the global community was higher than an ethnic identity.

Young people showed to have a common high pride in Asian cultural traditions. Judging by this answer, it would mean they have pride in cultures other than their own local or even national culture. But it can be speculated whether this cultural pride indeed transcends national borders and refers to all Asia's many diverse cultures. In the end, not all feel they have a lot in common with other young people in Asia, and young people are keen to preserve their own cultural identity against other cultural influences.

Young people's citizenship is about working with and for the community, but also about developing oneself to achieve security and well-being before even considering political, national involvement. Young people in 'faster-developing' countries, however, may take the direction of neglecting the people orientation and focus on their own self with all kinds of social consequences.

A sense of citizenship may also differ from theoretical definitions. Young people tend to be aware of the expectations which older generation may hold on them, potentially due to learning certain expectations. However, they do not necessarily exercise those expectations. This must not mean to have a lack of interest, but to prefer another approach to dealing with issues in society; one that is not restricted to listening and voting. The opportunities may simply be missing.

Summarising the impression, young people in Asia-Pacific appear to be looking for active participation options that create tangible results in their immediate social environment as to create a benefit for the people, and themselves, too. By this summary, citizenship is defined by activity, action or activeness.

It can be said that an understanding of citizenship identity is primarily shaped through this tendency to be active and result oriented without restricting oneself to a political affiliation.

2. Detailed Analysis

2.1 Political Participation means Community Involvement

In Table 2, derived from the ICCS 2009 survey, students indicated their belief on how a citizen should engage with politics. Common and almost universal agreement is found for voting in national elections in Thailand (96.9 percent), South Korea (96.6 percent) and Indonesia (95.4 percent), and still high agreement for Hong Kong (85.5 percent) and Taipei (74.6). Nevertheless, it is noticeable that in both Chinese cities voting experiences a lesser agreement suggesting a lower interest in politics, or at least in the act of voting.

Lower interest in politics becomes more apparent for Hong Kong and Taipei when looking at the question for joining a political party. While Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand range between 53.9 and 67 percent of students agreeing that a citizen should join a political party, only 16.6 percent of Taipei students and 20.4 percent of Hong Kong students agree here. Again, this indicates a difference in students' attitude towards political participation in these societies.

Also, that a citizen should engage in political discussions experiences a relatively low score compared to voting, this time with 47 percent for Indonesian students, compared to 57 percent for Hong Kong and 50.8 percent for Taipei students. South Korean and Thai students still show relatively high agreement to political discussions with 75.5 and 70.5 percent. To compare these statistics, a low value of discussing political matters was also identified in the UNDP report on Youth and Democratic Citizenship in East and South-East Asia (2014a) that is based on the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). Among 12 countries of East and South-East Asia, only 6.8 percent of youth would discuss political issues (see Figure UNDP 2). At first sight, this would indicate a severe lack of interest. Nevertheless, only 9.9 percent of their adult counterparts would discuss politics, too.

While the UNDP statistics shows that young people actively discuss politics almost never, the ICCS statistics display that i) young people have a duty awareness if and when they are confronted with political matters as part of being a citizen, and ii) that the value of political matters finds differently high or low expression.

To underline this interpretation, the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey shows that youth's voting turnout in East Asian countries has been much lower than that of adults during the last election period in their respective countries (with 65.2 percent for youth vs. 87 percent for adults) (Chang 2012: 2). The same goes for campaign participation (25.6 percent vs. 34.6 percent) (ibid.: 2). However, the ICCS statistics suggest that the students have awareness of their duty to vote as almost every student agrees on that a citizen should vote. Nonetheless, the execution of this awareness, as seen in the ABS, appears to be lacking.

Furthermore, it is noticeable that about half of the East and South East Asian youth population (49 percent) is interested in politics, which reflects in 61 percent following political news (see Figure UNDP2 and UNDP 2014a: 28). Among the ICCS population, following political issues through the media experiences high expressions across the countries/cities with the highest in South Korea at 91.8 percent and the lowest in Indonesia at still 72.6 percent. That means, young people are indeed willing to be informed about political developments, even when engaging in discussions, voting or joining a political party is not everyone's preference. In addition, although expressions vary remarkably between the countries of East and South East Asia, youth also show proactivity for lobbying and activism in support of political matters (Graphic UNDP4). This indicates that young citizens are not necessarily uninformed when it comes to politics, neither are they completely apathetic because of not participating in voting as much as adults do. This is also accentuated through research by Lall (2012) in Pakistan. The author shows that

young Pakistani on the one hand are politically aware to 48.5 percent, but active are only 26.8 percent (ebd.: 278).

Liem and MacInerney (2010) also investigated citizenship-related attributes among young Indonesians. The authors asked what their conception of a good citizen is (Table 11). Taking part in political activities found a rather neutral expression, with the majority (45.1 percent) neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Knowing about governmental policies, in contrast, was agreed upon by 57.1 percent and highly agreed upon by 13.3 percent. It can also be seen that concerns about the law and rights are more important for young Indonesians than political matters, but it is still obvious that politics is important to some degree.

Political involvement is also split among Bangladeshi youth, which a British Council report (2010) found where 30.5 percent believe they should be involved and 30.5 percent believe they should not be involved, leaving 39 percent not to be sure about either (see ebd.: 15). The more recent 2015 (British Council: 6) report on Bangladeshi youth further worsen the picture with only 13 percent having been active in their communities.

Statistics show that political participation finds varying expression among youth in terms of percentage of a population different for each society and in terms of activities. It also seems that at least half of the youth seek to be informed about political developments – at least more are informed than are active according to the numbers. What stands out is the difference of being aware of citizenship values regarding political participation and exercising the same.

An important explanation for the difference in political participation may be pointed out in Lall's (2012) study. To quote two Pakistani youth from the study:

“[...] I am quite informed about politics but there is no such personality which would be able to change the fate of Pakistan, therefore condition [sic] is quite adverse and everyone is trying to earn money. No one cares about the state.” (2012: 281)

“WHEN THE PEOPLE HAVE ENOUGH TO EAT THEN COME TO ME [sic] AND ASK ABOUT CITIZENSHIP.” (ebd.: 282) (angry student)

These quotes reflect that survival is a priority before engaging with higher affairs, as in political affairs. This notion represents the Theory on Post-Materialism (Inglehart 1981), which explains that when primary goods which guarantee security for basic survival are satisfied (such as food, clothing, housing) only then other regarding goods becomes relevant (e.g. self-expression, artistry, etc.). Applying this theory would suggest that the condition for a post-materialist society must be given before an individual engages with political matters. Under this condition, being informed is what young people want to opt for. Last but not least, societies or education systems certainly do not preach political participation - whether this is voting or candidature - as if Christmas, Hanukah, Spring Festival or any other celebration was about to come when young people reach legal age as to spark enthusiasm. To those primary goods also accounts health care, given that good health is necessary in order to be active in any regard. The British Council 2015 report shows that to 99 percent of Bangladeshi youth health care is absolute key priority, followed by quality education at also 99 percent.

Moreover, young citizens grow older, found a family, become more engaged with society through employment or have their daily lives affected by government policies. The more they advance in life, the likelier their participation in politics increases when and if it becomes a relevant tool in their life. This also accounts for voting practices, which at a young age may have little meaning, but as an adult becomes a way of making their voice heard.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that societies want everyone to become a political influencer – whether this is for reasons of potentially losing control over the population or creating a labour force imbalance.

In the UNDP report *Reaching and Engaging the Cambodian Youth on Issues of Civic Participation* (2014b), 16 percent of Cambodian youth indicate to strongly agree and 41 percent to agree with young people should be involved in politics (Figure UNDP5). These numbers represent a little more than half of the surveyed population. With an eye on their responses regarding community involvement, however, these numbers compare relatively low while community involvement experiences a higher preference.

Adolescents of Malaysia were shown to be less duty-minded than their adult counterparts - at least at first sight - but still to be engaged citizens (Samsudin et al 2012: 477). The explanation for this results is mentioned as younger people not yet being allowed to vote or becoming part of a political party due to their age, and, thus, not fully taking part in all of the citizenship participation options (ebd.). But this does not distinguish them as being uninvolved in society. The authors point out that young Malay are connected to forms of participation such as volunteering “to offer assistance to the less fortunate segment of society, becoming involved in environmental conservation, and showing respect for law and order.” (ebd.: 478)

That a feeling of duty may not be the reason why young people engage in their communities or wish to do so finds resemblance in the UNDP report (2014b) where Cambodian youth indicate to only 19 percent on the community level and 22 percent on the national level to vote in order to fulfil their duty as citizen (ebd.: 21), but the overwhelming majority at 64/65 percent (national/community level) decides to vote because they want to choose the leader (Figure UNDP6).

The *Survey On Youth Perceptions of Elections and Good Governance in the Philippines* (2013) also showed that about half of all young people are willing to follow up on campaign and election promises, and that the main method of doing this would be through communication in school, communities or online. (ebd.: 9). Besides that this survey shines another light on young people wishing to be informed about political developments to a certain extent, their approach is community-focussed, with the addition of using online media.

The ICCS students also showed a common attitude towards participation in community development. Between 84 percent (Hong Kong) and 92.6 percent (Thailand) of all students from the ICCS survey agree to participating in activities that benefit the community (Table 2). These numbers are higher than they are for political participation (except voting) as seen above.

The GIZ report *Youth Aspiration Study in Lao PDR* (2015) equally portrays young people as preferring to be involved in the community as opposed to governmental politics. 65 percent of Lao youth stated to be interested in knowing more about community activities, and 56 percent stated to be willing to join a community activity. Interest and willingness to join in central governmental programmes compare with 40 and 31 percent respectively (ebd.: 39).

Furthermore, a 2010 British Council report on Bangladesh found that 98 percent of Bangladeshi youth believe they should be involved in social work and 95 percent are willing and able to address community issues (ebd.: 19). This draws the picture that young Bangladeshi appear to have universal agreement on community involvement, but it stands in stark contrast with their actual participation rate.

These statistics leave to interpret that young people wish for participation in their immediate environment, while commonly defined political participation finds ambivalent if not low conviction. The study by Craig and Dyson (2014) in Western India underlines and amplifies this notion. They describe the rise of a ‘new politician’ who spends much time doing everyday political work, referring to lobbying, “motivating younger youth and taking part in a wide variety of other forms of negotiation within households and in local offices.” (ebd.: 972) They would also stress “their distance from mainstream political parties” (ebd.). These “new politicians” exercise alternative forms of political activities on the community level without being involved or affiliated with pre-defined political groups. The motivation of

these young people is often constituted by a gentle, generational force, incrementally seeking to improve aspects of local society through their networking, hustle and hard work with an attitude of creating and redistributing resources (ebd.: 977, 988). They distance themselves from politicians and contest hierarchies, and they perceive politics as competing over resources, especially money while responsibilities towards the people is forgotten:

“The elite [politicians] in our society are less aware than the poor. They are just drowned in their greed for wealth and money and have forgotten their rights and duties.” (ebd.: 281)

“Politics is not only about fighting for seats [...] It is also using your energy and negotiations to produce things for your people.” (ebd.: 983)

Young people appear to care about practical approaches which create tangible results in their environment. They seem to shun political affairs, even though they are aware of a citizen’s duty. Nevertheless, the clue indicate that young people want to be an active citizen; active in their terms and not by just marking a name on a piece of paper. “Young people centre their attention on joint work and on community participation, describing the democratic participation related to the local and to the immediate matter at hand.” (Tonon 2012: 17).

Nevertheless, with this new generation of ‘politicians’ may also come about another motivation of engaging in community/political affairs. Even though money and power may not be the motivation for young people, recognition in the best case and self-importance in the worst may be a driving factor. The latter would shift the gains from their activities, but still question the altruistic nature.

After a lengthy discussion on political and community matters. It has been shown that awareness of duties and exercising the relevant values are not necessarily accompanying each other. Another outstanding find comes from the British Council report (2010) on Bangladesh where Bangladeshi youth were asked how many are actually involved in community work. 70 percent replied not to be active (although 98 percent said they should be active), displaying a discrepancy between ‘should’ and ‘do’. This shows that an indication of wishing to be active or believing they should be active must not reflect their actual involvement – for reasons that would have to be explored. One indication may arise from the statistics of those who are active in community work come primarily from urban areas (31 percent), and only 6 percent come from rural areas. This may suggest that urban youth have more opportunities to work in their communities and/or that rural youth have more frequent family/household obligations.

2.2 Civic Knowledge is Present

The participating countries in Asia-Pacific scored comparatively even with the ICCS global average on students’ civic knowledge (Table 4). Thereby, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taipei scored above the average while Thailand and Indonesia scored below.

It can be seen that there is a gap between societies from East Asia and South East Asia. Much more interesting is that in all 5 survey populations a gender difference was identified, whereas females scored in each population higher on civic knowledge than their male counterparts. The remarkably highest difference can be found in Thailand where young females scored about 10 percentage points higher than young Thai males, leaving to understand that female Thai have a slightly greater knowledge in civic affairs. Even though Indonesians did not score as high as other students, Liem and MacInerney (2010) showed that young Indonesians to a great majority agrees to ‘a good citizen knows about government policies’,

which reflects that young people have an awareness of the need for civic knowledge if they want to be a good citizen.

2.3 A Relation with the Government

When asking the ICCS population about their view of the government (Table 5), they highly agreed between 86 percent in South Korea and 96 percent in Indonesia that the government should take care of its people like parents would take care of their children. This reflects the high expectation among youth that their governments should be responsible for their citizens. This offers to view the nation-responsibility-relationship from a different angle as it positions the government as having responsibilities for the nation, too, as opposed to the government expecting that citizens should adopt an attitude of responsibility for the nation.

Based on the ICCS South Korean population dataset, Knowles (2015) tested the students' attachment to Asian values (Table 10). South Korean students display a greater – and also the highest – attachment to the state or respectively to the government to function as caretaker and moral leader. However, they also show the lowest acceptance rate regarding obedience or following adults, as will be explored below. This offers the interpretation, they wish to have the national security and stability provided through the government while exercising a sense of individuality. In simpler words: I do what I want regardless what adults expect, but the state has to take care of me.

Then, it was highlighted that the role of the government is to promote religious/spiritual life. However, this finding once more divides the societies with Indonesian (92 percent) and Thai students (94 percent) accentuating this expectation while Taipei and South Korean students agree to a lesser degree (71 and 70 percent), and Hong Kong even more so with only 47 percent of students agreeing. Generally, spiritual and religious stimulation appears important to young people, but most so in two community-oriented countries; a phenomenon that my find repetition in other countries of similar characteristics.

Youth show to have high expectations on their governments. Therefore, it is interesting to see a comparison with the pride in their government system from the Asian Barometer Survey (Figure ABS1). Young people from Thailand, Singapore, Viet Nam, China and Malaysia appear to express the most pride in the governmental system, and Japan and South Korea express the lowest pride. This finding offers a valuable angle since it positions the high expectations from South Koreans on the government (ICCS population) against the support of the government system (ABS population). The Thai students who hold high expectations of their government (ICCS population) expressed also high pride in their government at the time (ABS population). Criticism of the government is more typical of youth in more affluent and open societies, while more favourable evaluations tend to be more common in less open societies (UNDP 2014a: 43, 46, 47). In addition, political settings at the times of both surveys will surely have influenced young people's perception.

2.4 The Role of Law

The law displays to play an overall significance to young people in countries of Asia and the Pacific. When the ICCS population was asked about whether a person who obeys the law is a good citizen, it found almost complete agreement in Indonesia and Thailand with 97.7 percent and 97.6 percent respectively. Students from South Korea agree to 91.5 percent. In comparison, students from Hong Kong and Taipei show the law to be lesser but still high relevance with 74.5 and 74.4 percent agreeing (see Table 1).

The Survey On Youth Perceptions Of Elections And Good Governance carried out in the Philippines in 2013 similarly underlined that law-abidingness is the most important responsibility of a good citizen at 37 percent, followed by voting in elections at 27 percent (2013: 9).

Law-abidingness can also be interpreted a priority concern for young Cambodians. The UNDP report (2014b) showed that youth indicate to 17 percent at the national level and 23 percent at the local level crime and lawlessness to be a concern, making it the highest priority concern among the given options. To compare, the next highest priority is poor infrastructure at 9 percent. (see Figure UNDP7)

In a study on Indonesian students' citizenship-related attributes by Liem and MacInerney (2010), the authors asked what youth's conception of a good citizen is (Table 11). The overwhelming majority indicated 'to respect the rights of others' (49.4 percent agreed, 44 percent strongly agreed) and 'to obey the law' (43.5 percent agreed, 44.6 percent strongly agreed) as the most commonly agreed upon value of being a good citizen. This is closely followed by trying to obtain more rights for people and trying to change the laws.

These statistics evidence that young people, in general as much as in theory, strongly uphold a positive relationship with the law. Judging by these statistics, young people appear to respect justice, value order as much as reemphasizing on legal norms which may also represent a strong moral as much as an attitude of obedience.

2.5 Behaving Morally, or Not

Among the ICCS population, moral is indeed a commonly considered necessity to be a good citizen, especially for Indonesia and Thailand with 90.3 and 93.8 percent. South Korea, on the contrary, displays a drop in this element with only 62.4 percent of students agreeing, leaving space to question whether young Koreans consider other ways to be a 'good citizen' (see Table 1). In the face of a highly competitive society, functional citizenship may be considered necessary, too; functional in terms of being knowledgeable or skilled for civic or labour matters.

To further explore moral attitudes among the ICCS population Fraillon et al (2013) analysed the students' agreement regarding the use of connections to hold public offices. In summary, students from Indonesia and Thailand are more likely to accept nepotism, and to support paternalism and communalism. Hong Kong, South Korea and Taipei across the board showed a low acceptance of the same values with roughly between 10 and 20 percent, except for the question about not allowing political leaders to recruit family members where only 56 percent of South Koreans agreed, while nearly all Taipei students agreed (93 percent). (see Table 3) Furthermore, Indonesia and Thailand expressed that they should vote for leaders of their communities (57 and 53 percent respectively). They also indicate to 69 and 59 percent respectively that only candidates they have connections with would serve them later. It would also be relatively acceptable to Indonesian and Thai students to vote for a friend/relative even when knowing he/she would not be the best candidate (34 and 40 percent). That government officials can give preference to family and friends when hiring was also accepted by 63 percent of the Thai students, and still by 38 percent of the Indonesian students.

It appears that there is a divide between students from countries of East and South East Asia on the awareness or knowledge of corrupting behaviour; a phenomenon that may not be of a surprise but can need further investigation. Indonesian and Thai students show to be inclined towards personal relations, relations that may presumably be vital to advance in these societies. On the other hand, the support for nepotism, paternalism and communalism may be the very reason why these elements remain in these societies when young people keep exercising these elements.

As mentioned, there may be a lack of awareness. It should be noticed, when students were pinpointed towards a candidate not being the best choice for a job despite being a friend or relative, the acceptance rate is lower for both Indonesia and Thailand compared to the generic question about supporting a candidate they have connections with. It is intelligible that people want to support the people they have good relations with and those who benefit them. But these students may have indicated that there are youth in South East Asian societies, and potentially in South Asia, who are not aware about the implications when choosing personal connections over qualified individuals.

In addition, Thai and Indonesian students also showed a higher propensity towards corruption (Table 7). 30 percent of Indonesians accept bribery to the government if it serves to get things done, and 35 percent accept that officials use public money for personal benefits. Both these values are found to be even higher among Thais with 71 percent accepting bribery and 48 percent accepting public money squandering.

To contrast, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taipei display low acceptance between 10 and under 20 percent. At least according to the statistics, these young people would choose the right person for the right job and not 'purchase' governmental services. One may wonder: Is it that a greater awareness or understanding of these issues has helped these societies advance faster in an economic sense or have economically advanced societies influenced on the awareness of their students? Then again, as demonstrated above, being aware of a favourable value does not mean to exercise the same.

With the example from South Korea, "students seem to have enough knowledge to do well on tests, but they do not seem to understand the true value and meaning of [civic] knowledge [...] While students possess knowledge about what is right and desirable to do in a democratic society, they do not seem to internalize it to a degree that they can translate it into action." (Cha et al. 2016: 3)

Youth from two schools in Singapore highlighted their responsibility as citizens to maintain social cohesion and promote diversity in Singapore. They were also able to draw parallels to other countries, and to demonstrate their critical thinking abilities. (Ho 2011: 37) However, despite being able to critically analyse causes of conflict in other countries, the students were unable to extend this analysis into other contexts, including Singapore's. (ibid.) Despite the numerous examples of discrimination, such as in Sri Lanka, no student appeared to be aware of any examples of discrimination faced by minorities in Singapore (ibid.: 34).

Knowing about values must not mean to be aware of them, and being aware must not mean to exercise the same. Knowing about what is expected does not mean to be conscious and reflective about one's own behaviour and beliefs. This may very well be the next challenge for human kind to truly develop – worldwide.

2.6 Obedience and the Self

The majority of young Lao are shown to learn and accept that the authority of older people and their parents are never to be questioned (GIZ 2015: 25). This means that more than half of the surveyed youth population accept that power is distrusted unequally, primarily based on age (ibid.).

When analysing the ICCS population regarding one should always follow the advice of elders in decision-making, the majority of students also agree, and Thailand and Indonesia are once more standing out with the highest percentage points at 93 and 78 percent respectively (Table 8). The students from Taipei and Hong Kong still agree to 68 and 63 percent, while South Koreans agree to a low percentage rate at only 36 percent.

A similar trend is visible with regards to status, whereas 86 percent of Thai students confirmed that the advice from people of higher status should always be followed. Hong Kong and Indonesian

students stand divided in this question with only 48 and 46 percent agreeing. Taipei students express an even lower agreement at 35 percent, and South Korea demonstrates again the lowest agreement with 19 percent.

Obedience to parents follows a similar path, where Thailand and Indonesia score at 95 and 92 percent, while South Korea displays the lowest of only 33 percent of students agreeing the expectation of always obeying they parents. The image of Thailand and Indonesia being paternalist- and hierarchy-oriented reappears as it was indicated in previous statistics, which leave to speculate if a lesser developed country is more inclined towards paternalist or hierarchical order. However, blind obedience to elders is not commonly accepted among Cambodian youth either, making them appear to share an attitude with South Koreans. Young Cambodians indicate to 70 percent that decisions by village leaders should be questioned (UNDP 2014b: 21).

These statistics contrast youth's acceptance of obedience based on age, relationship and social status. Each of these societies will influence on youth's thinking differently due to all of them struggling with different social issues deriving from economic, political and even educational concerns.

The case for South Korean students, for example, was further analysed. Knowles (2015) tested the population's attachment to Asian values (see Table 10). The author displayed the agreement to the values of 'follow elders', 'follow position' (hierarchy), 'obey teachers' and 'obey parents' on a scale of 1 to 4, with 4 'strong agreement' and 1 'strong disagreement'. Obeying teachers found the lowest score at 2.00. Following elders scored relatively low at 2.28, but still higher than following parents at 2.22. Also following a social status finds relatively low acceptance at 2.16. The statistics speak for a youth population that is inclined towards making their own decision and coming up with their own solutions, independently and autonomously, potentially with oppositional character towards adults. This would reflect the process of strengthening individuality among young Koreans, just as it is desired by current educational goals (http://english.moe.go.kr/web/1691/site/contents/en/en_0203.jsp) - for the worse of for the better.

More interesting to see is that statistically significant gender differences were discovered, showing that males have a tendency to obey or follow authority more often than females would (Table 10).

Another explanation for the seemingly deviant attitudes among South Koreans may come with progressing emphasis on developing individuality – or cultivation of the Self, as it is often found in literature. The cultivation of the Self displays a high score among the ICCS population, being close to or above 90 percent. The students from Hong Kong, Taipei, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia nearly universally consider it as important or very important to develop their own being (Table 1). Similar results are displayed by Pan (2011), analysing Beijing students' citizenship values (also see Tables 12-14). Even though the differences are marginal, behaving responsibly and strengthening one's confidence rank at the top of the most important aspects as civic values (ebd.: 291), as much as other values which indicate the cultivation of the Self find common high agreement. South Koreans may just demonstrate the most advanced case of self-cultivation or individuality which – for the worse or for the better – has consequences in societal interactions.

For example, among the ICCS population expresses high agreement for social harmony (Table 8), but South Koreans have the lowest agreement at 76 percent. Thailand and Indonesia display the highest emphasis on social harmony with 96 and 94 percent of students agreeing with classmates or colleagues should not argue in order to maintain harmony.

2.7 Global Values and Expectations on Society

The ICCS students also showed a common attitude towards the promotion of human rights and environmental protection (see Table 2). They all display a high agreement towards participation in these categories, indicating a high and almost universal readiness to support these areas. Particularly, Thai students showed the highest agreement toward participation in these categories ranging from 91.9 percent for human rights to 94.3 percent for environment protection. This suggests that Thai youth may be the most active among the surveyed population. Indonesian students appear to be the second most active group as 91.4 percent agree to participating in environment protection. However, in contrast, 78.4 percent of Hong Kong students agree to participate in human rights activities, making this the lowest agreement score among the ICCS student population. This is not a bad nor low score, but it shows a slightly more hesitant reaction towards promoting human rights.

The category of participating in peaceful protests against laws believed to be unjust displays a greater variation. Youth in the ICCS countries are not necessarily ready to protest as a means of making their citizen voice heard – at least not aloud. Two third of all ICCS students agree on participating in peaceful protests, but their scores are not as high as they were for supporting human rights and environmental protection. The exception is South Korea where 89.9 percent of all students agree to participate in protesting against unfair laws, which would underline these student's readiness not to blindly obey.

When being asked about their pride in Asia's cultural traditions and its progress in democracy and human rights, it can be found that on average 87 percent of the ICCS students agree to be proud regarding these elements. The great majority of these students being proud on Asia's traditions, democracy and human rights efforts indicates that these young people also highly identify with these concepts, which may lead to upholding these values even further.

'Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government.' Overall, 83 percent of the ABS youth agreed on this statement (UNDP 2014: 41), suggesting that the great majority of youth believes in democracy. The highest indications were observed in Taiwan (94 percent), Japan and Singapore (88 percent) and Thailand (87 percent). The lowest rates appear in Viet Nam (72 percent) and China (77 percent), although in itself they are high. These youths appear to support democratic governance and democratic processes. This observation is underlined by the statistics from the ICCS where students indicated their general pride in the 'advancements with democracy in Asia' (Table 9).

More interestingly, even in China, Viet Nam and Singapore the value for democracy is high, according to the ABS, despite that the political system is one-party defined. This fact may indicate that 'democratic' is not necessarily interpreted by young people as a national-political concept. As mentioned before, youth emphasise on democratic participation related to the local and to the immediate matter at hand (Tonon 2012:17). 'Advancements in democracy in Asia-Pacific' may be understood as raising an understanding of the concept of involving everyone – whether this is for political or other affairs.

The UNDP report on youth democratic citizenship (2014a) also uncovered that on average 'good governance' is the most important value among young citizens with 30.8 percent, followed by 'social equity' with 27.4 percent, civic 'norms and procedures' to 22,7 percent and 'freedom and liberty' with just 19 percent as the least important value. (see Figure UNDP1) Good governance is especially valued among young Japanese (35.1 percent), Indonesians (37.7 percent) and Thais (34.9 percent), while it finds the least importance among young Filipinos (21.6 percent) and Cambodians (23.7 percent). The value for social equity is especially high for young Vietnamese with 44.6 percent, showing that Vietnamese value social equity most favourably before anything else. Freedom and liberty is the least important value on average, except for young Mongolians (29 percent).

Now, these comparisons become more interesting when understanding the definitions of these items a little deeper.¹ ‘Good governance’ contains elements referring to national stability and safety. ‘Social equity’ resembles the availability of goods for everyone, whether they are material goods or services. ‘Norms and procedures’ appears to refer to controlling the government, and ‘freedom and liberty’ refers to free opinions and assembly. Understandably, national stability and safety as well as the availability of goods dominates a (young) citizens’ thinking, while rendering control over the government and public freedom as less but not *unimportant*. This should come as no surprise after having found first indices in relation to political affairs in Pakistan. Security and survival represent the most important goods for a human being, which will only take a backseat when creating these goods becomes effortless (see the Theory of Post-Materialism by Inglehart 1981).

2.8 No Social Trust

The UNDP report based on the Asian Barometer Survey (2014a) shows that social trust among young people in Asia and the Pacific is relatively low with on average 23.8 percent of youngster holding social trust (Figure UNDP3). This score is also lower than the social trust of adults at 30.4 percent and seniors at 35.2 percent. In some countries, the gap is quite big. For example, young Indonesians show only 23.9 percent of trust in others while Indonesian seniors indicate trust at 56.1 percent. Exceptionally low is social trust among young Burmese and Cambodians with 7.5 percent and 6.8 percent respectively. Young Chinese, however, display social trust at 49.3 percent – higher than any other youth population.

The question that emerges is why young people have lower trust compared to adults and seniors, and why there are great differences among the countries. Perhaps social trust has not been ‘taught’ or experienced yet, or young people experience more disappointing or deceptive experiences, which is also varying for each country. Whatever the reason, low social trust will impact on a common identity formation as it can be expected that people distance from each other when they do not trust in one another.

2.9 Irresponsibility or Unconsciousness

The primary reason for young Cambodians to vote in elections is to choose a leader instead of voting for a specific cause (UNDP 2014b). 65 percent would rather choose a certain person than voting for a due cause (infrastructure improvements at 10 percent). This may leave space to interpret that either young Cambodians need guidance from an authority figure or steer responsibilities away to another person, in addition to simply voting for someone who they have a relation with just as Thais and Indonesians

¹ **Social equity:** (1) Government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor. (2) Basic necessities, like food, clothes and shelter, are provided for all. (3) Government ensures job opportunities for all. (4) People receive state aid if they are unemployed.

Norms and procedures: (1) People choose the government leaders in free and fair election. (2) The legislature has oversight over the government. (3) Multiple parties compete fairly in the election. (4) The court protects the ordinary people from the abuse of government power.

Good governance: (1) Government does not waste any public money. (2) Government provides people with quality public services. (3) Government ensures law and order. (4) Politics is clean and free of corruption.

Freedom and liberty: (1) People are free to express their political views openly. (2) People are free to organize political groups. (3) Media is free to criticize the things government does. (4) People have the freedom to take part in protests and demonstrations.

displayed in the ICCS survey. Last but not least, Cambodian youth indicated that infrastructure is their second highest concern after crime (see Figure UNDP6).

The notion to steer responsibilities away is visible among the Indonesian and Thai ICCS population. Almost half of the youth agree on passing on the responsibility of preventing corruption to adults (Table 7). The before mentioned missing awareness or understanding of implications which their decisions have in civic affairs moves in the forefront again.

2.10 Cultural Appreciation and a Sense of Identity

Learning about the country's history was commonly accentuated by the ICCS population, indicating that students value learning about historical backgrounds that shaped the country they live in today (Table 2). But also in this category, the scores vary. The lowest scores are in South Korea (75 percent), Hong Kong (78.6 percent) and Taipei (78.7 percent), and the highest in Indonesia (93.8 percent) and Thailand (92 percent). It appears that the more developed societies show a lesser, though still high, relevance of learning about their past.

This general trend of interest in their origin is reflected in their agreements towards the preservation of their traditional culture (Table 6). All populations indicate the wish for learning more about their country's traditional cultures, with particularly Thailand and Indonesia at both 98 percent. South Korea indicates the same to 82 percent. Taipei and Hong Kong range in between those figures.

Controversially, all students also indicate a high agreement on maintaining a unique cultural identity against the influence of other cultures (Table 6). The lowest percentage displays South Korea with 73 percent of the students agreeing to maintain their own culture against the influences of other cultures – which is still high. But the highest, almost universal agreement express Indonesian and Thai students with 95 and 96 percent respectively. Given the higher emphasis in South East Asia countries, it may hint at a struggle for identity – whether in order to maintain it or to fortify it. Overall, traditional culture appears important in building youths' citizen identity, as much as protecting it against influences.

Asking the ICCS youth about their identification with Asia (Table 9), they commonly agree to a high level. Between 80 and 85 percent of the students say they are proud to be an Asian citizen, leaving not much difference between the individual populations. But when specifically asking whether they think of themselves as an Asian citizen, Indonesian and Thai with 72 percent and 77 percent contrast Taipei, South Korean and Hong Kong students with respectively 91, 94 and 93 percent. This leaves to interpret that there may be a higher, transnational identity in those societies or that Asianness is defined by other values, such as ethnicity.

In this regard, Lee (2010) analyzed young Taiwanese' sense of belonging in terms of civic sense, ethnic sense and global sense.² The author found that a civic sense of belonging found greater attachment on a scale of 1 to 4 (1 no attachment, 4 complete attachment) than an ethnic or global sense. Civic sense compares on average with a score of 3.14 to ethnic sense with 2.64 and global sense with 2.9. This means that young Taiwanese rather identify with the people living in their environment than identifying with an ethnic group. An identity based on ethnicity is further undermined, considering that identification with the global community is also higher.

When specifically asked whether the ICCS students feel to have a lot in common with other people in Asia, a drop in agreement can be found. Indonesian students, for example, only agree to 77 percent

² Civic sense of belonging referred to the state or city, such as closeness to and commonness with people living in the city and country. Ethnic sense of belonging referred to the attachment to the ethnic group, such as feelings of closeness and membership. Taipei youth were strongly attached to people living in Taiwan than to their on ethnic group, such as Minnanese, Hakka or Mainlander

that they would have a lot in common with other Asians; South Korean students indicate to only 62 percent that they would have a lot in common with other Asians. There appears to be a difference between being proud of Asian cultures and having a lot in common with them.

It can be seen that a common sense of cultural pride prevails among some of the Asia-Pacific youth, and although the majority thinks of themselves as Asian citizens, they somewhat are aware of the differences that set them apart. If Taiwan was to account as an Asia-Pacific-wide representation, young people would not identify with each other mainly based on ethnicity, but on sharing the same living space. However, it is left to speculate whether the interpretation of culture by these young people is subject to religious understanding, too. How likely is it that a Christian South Korean or a Buddhist Thai is proud of Indonesian Islamic practices and vice versa?

3. Theoretical Underpinnings of Citizen Identities

Arnot and Schwartz (2012) defined citizenship through belongingness to social location and emotional attachment, as much as through ethical and political values (ebd.: 6). The elements of this broad definition of citizenship are certainly identifiable among the youth populations analysed in this report. Youth have been shown to support involvement in the local communities as much as having their moral and political values. Given the breadth of this definition, it offers little value to define a certain persona citizen. It does offer, however, an understanding that citizenship is about more than a political element.

Harris and Roose (2014) argued that young people “are turning away from classic civic associations and institutions, including unions, community organisations, political parties and youth clubs, and instead creating informal, short-term and individualised forms of civic identification and participation.” (ebd.: 800) In particular the examples from West India showed the ‘turning away’ from classic institutions, where youth follow their own paths of working with the community by functioning as ‘new politicians’. A tendency of disobedience or simply following less the advice and aspiration of elders, as shown with South Korea and Cambodia, also fits into the argument of young people ‘turning away’. Bennett (2003 by Harris and Roose 2014: 801) has described this as the emergence of the ‘self-actualising citizen’, whereby young people define their own citizenship paths through individual action. The more individualised a society becomes, the more can be expected that youth will exercise their own forms of civic identification. The phenomenon that young people know about their citizenship duties but do not necessarily exercise them may also indicate this turn-away.

Berzonsky (1989, 2011 by Crocetti et al 2014: 1819) distinguished three identity styles: information-oriented, normative and diffuse-avoidant styles. Adolescents with an information-oriented style would actively seek out and evaluate self-relevant information. They are likely to actively explore identity alternatives before making their own commitments. These individuals would be characterised by the need for cognition. Meaning, they have a need for interacting with their social environment, interpreting it and finding solution strategies to problems through experiences. This type of a citizen, that seeks to interact with its environment, can be found among the analysed youth populations to varying degrees. This type would further exhibit positive interpersonal relationships through empathy and prosocial behaviours (Crocetti et al 2014: 1819).

Young people with a normative style more often adopt values from significant others and conform to their expectations (Berzonsky 1989 by Crocetti et al 2014: 1819). These individuals “tend to enact commitments in a more automatic fashion, without much exploration of identity alternatives” (ebd.). Their memberships tend to be short-lived, as to allow for exploration. Furthermore, they tend to have a need for closure and mainly rely on collective attributes. This identity type can also be found among the

analysed youth populations, whereas it may fit into the examples where youth follow older generations without much questioning. They would also display very close and supportive family relationships.

Young people with a diffuse-avoidant style would delay dealing with identity issues. These adolescents are not likely to explore identity alternatives or to enact meaningful commitments and they have a propensity to emphasize aspects of their self-elements (e.g. my reputation, my popularity) (Crocetti et al 2014: 1819). They would also display low levels of conscientiousness or need for cognition, but maladaptive coping strategies (e.g. anxiety, avoidance). This type would have family relational problems, low levels of empathy and prosocial behaviours. This identity type cannot be straightforwardly identified among the analysed population. It can be speculated, though, whether these are the individuals who frequently disagree on certain items as asked in the respective youth surveys and if these are the individuals who tend to pass on responsibilities.

The youth citizen identity that is most likely to be represented among the youth in Asia-Pacific, based on the present survey data, may be one of the first two identity styles of being information-oriented and/or normative, depending on the level of development of the respective country. However, the diffuse-avoidant type may become the reality with progressing individualism parred with missing societal contribution options.

Last but not least, Banks (2008) categorised citizen types into four categories. The legal citizen is a citizen who has rights and obligations to the nation-state but does not participate in the political system. The minimal citizen is a citizen who votes in local and national elections on conventional issues. The active citizen is a citizen who takes action beyond voting to change existing laws and common conventions. Finally, the transformative citizen takes action to actualise values and moral principles beyond those of conventional authority. Under the lamented missing political participation, one might suggest that youth are the legal citizen type. In fact, they are the active citizen type, potentially even the transformative type, as they express to seek to change their society which requires them to go beyond legal or minimal means.

Several factor have been discussed that appear to shape a young person's attitudes and behaviours. Whether they are community- or self-oriented, normative- or information-oriented, driven by cognition or emotional attachment, the common element they share is one of activity. Young people, as seen in the statistics, are looking for active participation options that create tangible results in their immediate environment as to create a benefit for themselves, too. Citizenship is defined by activity, action or activeness. An understanding of citizenship identity is, therefore, shaped through this tendency to be active and result oriented instead of being passive receivers of limited options, such as voting.

Nevertheless, there are elements that undermine this notion, such as a perceived inconsistency between the awareness and the execution of their values. Missing social securities and stabilities may interplay with this inconsistency, as people in general will only amplify their realm of concern when their basic needs have been met.

4. Citizenship and Identity

Based on the elaboration of the trends and issues that have been identified by interpreting, comparing and contrasting the above data material on youth's attitudes, beliefs and behaviours, it can be attempted to synthesise youth's senses of belonging.

The youth populations as analysed in this report had a common agreement regarding the appreciation of their own culture, which was highest for Indonesia and Thailand, and still high but lower for Hong Kong, Taipei and South Korea. It can be said that youth in Asia-Pacific identify highly with their

own cultural origin, and they share the opinion of protecting their own national culture against outside influences, which emphasises youth's cultural identification only further.

Naturally, a high identity with their own culture and protection against the influence of outside cultures sounds like a goal every country can be certain to achieve. But this strong cultural identification can cause social conflicts, such as xenophobia, when other people display a distinct culture.

Against this cultural identification can be held the finding that an identity with Asia as a whole was also generally high. This speaks for a greater identification than only with the national sphere, and means in a neutral way that young people are not disassociated from other countries or cultures. Nevertheless, differences in the identification with 'Asianness' were recognisable, with young people from East Asia leaning towards a lesser identification with Asia – although still high. This can be interpreted in an ambivalent way: Either young people from East Asia have a greater awareness about the cultural diversities across the region which is why it would be difficult to relate to being *one* Asian people, or those young people have built a stronger national identity based on geographical limitations. The former could be understood on a positive note with young people realising the diversity in the region. The latter may be a problem when national cultural identity leads to segregation from other Asian cultures. Another explanation for the difference may relate to the awareness of cultural differences, which would require investigation: How is Asianness displayed in countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore etc.? Is Asianness built upon ethnic criteria; mainly East Asian ethnicity? To what extent influences religion cultural identity?

According to a study in Taiwan, young people did not distinguish themselves by ethnicity as the main criteria. They identified through sharing the same living environment. They also identified higher with the global community than with an ethnic community. It is unlikely that this finding can represent other societies, however, especially when societies value the non-intrusion of other cultures, which tends to go hand in hand with the presence of other ethnicities.

The hint at an identification with the people living in the same environment may be accentuated by the obvious finding that young people seek to be active in their respective communities – or in other words: in their living environment. Dealing with community matters has stood out for the most part of this report. Young people appear to be very active or at least to have the wish to be active. The young mind can be said to be practical and result-oriented, according to the findings. Young people in Asia and the Pacific are in no way disassociated from their communities; they rather display a strong local identification through active participation, which very likely arises from the psychological need for cognition but also from developing their Self (individuality) and striving for practical solutions.

A young person that seeks to interact with its social environment is likely to develop positive attributes, such as cherishing prosocial behaviour and attachment to its surrounding. A young person that does not engage is likely to exercise the contrary. This only further cements the reason why it is crucial to involve young people in all aspects of society – to create a connection between them and with the society.

The attitude resulting from such a mindset also appears to oppose political ways of dealing with society; or at least the political ways that are traditionally expected to count as political ways. The youth population showed its very awareness of a dutiful citizen. However, they also showed that the expected duties - voting, rallying, political party joining - are not the ways young people prefer. Instead of emphasising young people's participation in those traditional political activities as understood by previous generations, perhaps it is time to accept new ways of political participation and to re-interpret the very term of 'political'. Currently, it appears that in discourse 'political' refers to the national sphere. However, a young person shaping his/her community by taking part in an assembly for making community level decisions is just as political as are politicians taking part in assemblies for nation-wide decisions. Moreover, young people lamented that politics is about fighting for resources, while politics, as exercised by young people, is about redistribution of resources.

Political or not, the youth as analysed in this report are certainly not the partisan type and appear to re-emphasise the argument of young people preferring short-lived memberships to allow for the exploration of alternative solutions, instead of adhering to political party-associated expectations. By this assumption, youth may be the most pluralistic population - in political terms. Youth associate on the local, community level.

Some countries oppose the notion of communalism, and by the present interpretations, young people from Asia-Pacific, appear to be all about communalism. In contrast, the youth population does not feel unrelated to their governments: The analysed youth value their governments quite highly, if and when their governments take care of their citizens. The expectation is that governments should take care of their citizens like parents of their children. In return, youth show their pride in the government systems, or criticism where needed. So, even when young people prefer to be active at the local, community level, they are conscious about having a relation with their national governments, which indicates a belonging to a higher, non-communal sphere. This appeared also to be true for the self-oriented society of South Korea where students prefer to follow themselves while at the same time having high agreement on the government being a caretaker and moral guide. Looking for national leadership was also found in the very different society of Cambodia.

The Asia-Pacific youth fit the concept of being active if not transformative as they are the agents that seek to alter society for the better. They seemingly do not wish to work against current systems but to improve them, leading by example. The interpretation of a governmental caretaker should make that obvious. The association with a governmental caretaker or leader also demonstrates that youth have an awareness of belonging to the national sphere.

Furthermore, the high agreement to exercising environmental protection and respect for human rights as well as applying democratic principles for social inclusion displays the awareness of and orientation towards global values, which connects young people transcending borders. Even though young people display a belonging to the community level with an awareness of the national, they tend to apply global values – at least they indicate they would.

In this report it shined through a couple of times that there is a discrepancy between what a citizen should do and what young people really do. Even though they have the awareness of certain values, they do not necessarily exercise them. Despite finding moral as a necessary value for being a good citizen (with exception to some degree in South Korea), exercising this value has shown a discrepancy between being aware of a value and exercising the same. This finding was also existent for voting and even community participation. In the case of moral, however, it appears that youth in countries of South East Asia have a missing understanding about their individual (corruptive) actions, even when they have learnt to be a moral person. This may be the case for other countries of similar socio-economic development, too. This shows that young people follow – consciously or unconsciously – exemplified *mis*behavioural norms, such as bribery and nepotism and an identification with these values. This finding may indicate a great need for lifting human consciousness to the next level to become aware of one's own individual actions, not just the actions of others.

All in all, youth's citizenship is shaped by an identification with the community where they originate from and its related cultural practices. This does not oppose nor neglect a national identification because of missing traditional political participation. Politics for youth appears to start on the community ground and refers to practical actions, and it seems to follow global values, in particular democracy. Youth are a member of the society they live in with an orientation towards the immediate surrounding, and an awareness for the nation. Youth also share cross-country, global values and may be aware of the cultural diversity that stretches across Asia-Pacific, which, however, must not mean to identify with other cultures in Asia-Pacific. If youth were to disassociate from a society, it is likely based on cultural practices, not so much on ethnicity. But even this identification may not be their own choice due to the fact that education

plans accentuate on the conservation of national culture up to a patriotic, perhaps even foreign culture antagonising, degree.

II. Bibliography

Annot, Madeleine and Sharlene Swartz, 2012: Youth citizenship and the politics of belonging: introducing contexts, voices, imaginaries, In: *Comparative Education*, 48:1, 1-10. Taylor and Francis.

Banks, James A., 2008: Diversity, Group Identity, and Citizenship Education in a Global Age. In: *Educational Researcher*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 129-139. American Educational Research Association. Sage.

British Council, 2010: Bangladesh: The next generation report.

British Council, 2015: Next Generation Bangladesh 2015 and Beyond.

Cha, Yun-Kyung, Seung-Hwan Ham, and Mi-Eun Lim, 2016: Citizenship Education in Korea: Challenges and New Possibilities.

Communication Foundation For Asia, 2013: Survey On Youth Perceptions Final Report. Communication Foundation For Asia. Manila.

Craig, Jeffrey, and Jane Dyson, 2014: "I serve therefore I am": Youth and Generative Politics in India. In: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56.4, 967-994. Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History: Oxford.

Crocetti, Elisabetta, Rasa Erentaite and Rita Zukauskienė, 2014: Identity Styles, Positive Youth Development, and Civic Engagement. In *Adolescence Youth Adolescence* 43, 1818–1828. Springer Online.

Fraillon, Julian, Wolfram Schulz and John Ainley, 2012: ICCS 2009 Asian Report Civic knowledge and attitudes among lower-secondary students in five Asian countries. International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement.

Fraillon, Julian, Wolfram Schulz, John Ainley 2013: Attitudes towards political engagement among lower secondary students in East Asian countries: Results from ICCS 2009. Paper prepared for the 5th IEA International Research Conference in Singapore. International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement.

Harris, Anita and Joshua Roose, 2014: DIY citizenship amongst young Muslims: experiences of the 'ordinary'. In: *Journal of Youth Studies* Volume 17, Issue 6, 794-813. Taylor and Francis.

Ho, Li-Ching, 2011: Global Multicultural Citizenship Education in Singapore. In: *Multicultural Education Review*, 3:1, 25-44. Taylor and Francis.

Ho, Li-Ching, Jasmine B.-Y. Sim and Theresa Alviar-Martin, 2011: Interrogating differentiated citizenship education: Students' perceptions of democracy, rights and governance in two Singapore schools. In: *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice* 6(3), 265–276. Sage.

Inglehart, Ronald, 1981: Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity. In: *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75, No. 4, 880-900. JSTOR.

Knowles, Ryan T., 2015: Asian values and democratic citizenship: exploring attitudes among South Korean eighth graders using data from the ICCS Asian Regional Module. In: *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, 35:2, 191-212. Taylor and Francis.

Kuang, Xiaoxue and Kerry J. Kennedy, 2014: Asian Students' Perceptions of 'Good' Citizenship: The Role of Democratic Values and Attitudes to Traditional Culture. In: *Asia Pacific Journal of Educational Development* 3:1, 33-4. National Academy for Educational Research.

Lall, Marie, 2012: Why education matters: school 'choice' and differing views on citizenship in Pakistan. In: *Citizenship Studies*, 16:2, 269-286. Taylor and Francis.

Lee, Jennifer Wen Shya, 2010: Structure and Agency: A Comparison of Youth Learning of Citizenship in Taipei and Calgary. In: *Citizenship Pedagogies in Asia and the Pacific*, 81-106. *CERC Studies in Comparative Education* 28. Springer.

Liem and MacInerney, 2010: Indonesian Students and their Citizenship-Related Attributes: Implications for Instructional Strategies and Pedagogical Practices in Civic Education. In: *Citizenship Pedagogies in Asia and the Pacific*, pp.149-173. *CERC Studies in Comparative Education* 28. Springer Online.

Pan, Su-Yan, 2011: Multileveled citizenship and citizenship education: experiences of students in China's Beijing. In: *Citizenship Studies*, 15:02, 283-306. Taylor and Francis Online.

Park, Chong Min, 2012: The Youth's Evaluations of Quality of Governance in East Asia. Panel V: Paper 10. *Asian Barometer Online*.

Samsudin, Rahim A., Latiffah Pawanteh and Ali Salman, 2012: Citizenship Norms and the Participation of Young Adults in a Democracy. In: *International Journal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering* Vol:6, No:4, 2012. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology.

UNDP, 2014a: Youth and Democratic Citizenship in East and South-East Asia. Exploring political attitudes of East and South-East Asian youth through the Asian Barometer Survey. Bangkok.

UNDP, 2014b: Reaching and Engaging the Cambodian Youth on Issues of Civic Participation. Cambodia.

III. Annex

Table 1: Percentage of Students Who Strongly Agree and Agree to the Items

	Hong Kong	Indonesia	Korea	Thailand	Chinese
A person who obeys the law is a good citizen.	74.5	97.7	91.5	97.6	74.4
A person who obeys the law but does not behave morally is not a good citizen.	80.3	72.2	86.2	78.9	80.8
One can only be a good citizen if one is a good moral person.	79.1	90.3	62.4	93.8	76.1
Having good morality is more important than having good knowledge for one to be a good	88.5	76.1	85.5	90.5	91.6
Self-cultivation is an important process of becoming a good citizen.	92.9	94.6	89.3	92.8	93.1
For one to become a good citizen one must have a high quality of spirituality.	86.4	80.8	92.3	94	91.1
Even if a person behaves properly they cannot be a good citizen without a high quality of	67.3	76.4	73	86.4	76.3

(Kuang and Kennedy 2014: Asian Student's Perception of 'Good Citizenship')

Table 2: Percentage of Students Who Strongly Agree and Agree to the Items

	Hong Kong	Indonesia	Korea	Thailand	Chinese Taipei
Conventional citizenship					
Voting in every national election	85.5	95.4	96.6	96.9	74.6
Joining a political party	20.4	53.9	60.9	67	16.6
Learning about the country's history	78.6	93.8	75	92	78.7
Following political issues in the newspaper, on the radio, on TV or on the internet	89.3	72.6	91.8	90.6	87.2
Showing respect for government representatives	89	92.5	42.4	82	71.6
Engaging in political discussions	57	47	75.5	70.5	50.8
Social-movement-related citizenship					
Participating in peaceful protests against laws believed	64.7	78.5	89.9	64.4	63.9
Participating in activities to benefit people in the local community	84	91	83.4	92.6	88.6
Taking part in activities promoting human rights	78.4	83.7	83.5	91.9	90.1
Taking part in activities to protect the environment	88.3	91.4	87.7	94.3	88.4

(Kuang and Kennedy 2014: Asian Student's Perception of 'Good Citizenship')

Table 3: National Percentages of Students' Agreement with the Use of Connections to Hold Public Office

Percentages of students strongly agreeing or agreeing that:

Country	If there are many candidates in an election we should only vote for the people from our <hometown/local area>					Only the candidates we have <connections> with would truly serve us after they get elected					If a candidate is a friend or relative then we should vote for him/her even if he/she is not the best candidate for the job					It is acceptable for public officials to give preference to family and friends when hiring people for public office					It is acceptable for a public official to give government contracts to people they have <connections> with even if they are not the best qualified to do the contract work					Political leaders should not be allowed to give government jobs to their family members
	15	(0.6)	▼	20	(0.7)	▼	16	(0.6)	▼	17	(0.5)	▼	17	(0.6)	▼	93	(0.4)	▲								
Chinese Taipei	15	(0.6)	▼	20	(0.7)	▼	16	(0.6)	▼	17	(0.5)	▼	17	(0.6)	▼	93	(0.4)	▲								
Indonesia	57	(1.8)	▲	69	(1.4)	▲	34	(1.4)	△	51	(1.5)	▲	38	(1.7)	△	49	(0.9)	▼								
Korea	10	(0.6)	▼	29	(0.8)	▼	16	(0.7)	▼	20	(0.8)	▼	15	(0.7)	▼	56	(0.8)	▼								
Thailand	53	(1.4)	▲	59	(1.4)	▲	40	(1.5)	▲	74	(1.1)	▲	63	(1.4)	▲	68	(0.9)	△								
Average	34	(0.6)		44	(0.6)		28	(0.6)		40	(0.5)		33	(0.6)		67	(0.4)									
Hong Kong	13	(1.3)		22	(1.2)		18	(1.3)		18	(1.4)		15	(1.3)		78	(0.8)									

National percentage

- more than 10 percentage points above ICCS Asian average ▲
- significantly above ICCS Asian average △
- significantly below ICCS Asian average ▼
- more than 10 percentage points below ICCS Asian average ▼

() Standard errors appear in parentheses. Because results are rounded to the nearest whole number, some totals may appear inconsistent.

(Frailion et al 2013: Attitudes towards political engagement among lower secondary students in East Asian countries: Results from ICCS 2009)

Table 4: Gender Differences in Civic Knowledge among Students from Asian ICCS countries

Country	Mean Scale Score Females	Mean Scale Score Males	Difference Absolute Value (males-females)	Gender Difference				
				-100	-50	0	50	100
Indonesia	442 (3.9)	423 (3.5)	-19 (3.0)			■		
Korea, Republic of ¹	577 (2.4)	555 (2.3)	-22 (3.0)			■		
Chinese Taipei	573 (2.7)	546 (2.7)	-26 (2.5)			■		
Thailand [†]	474 (3.9)	426 (4.5)	-48 (4.5)			■		
ICCS Asian average	516 (1.7)	488 (1.7)	-29 (1.7)			■		
ICCS average	511 (0.7)	489 (0.7)	-22 (0.8)			■		

Country not meeting sampling requirements

Hong Kong SAR	564 (6.5)	543 (8.3)	-21 (9.8)			■		
---------------	-----------	-----------	-----------	--	--	---	--	--

Notes:

() Standard errors appear in parentheses. Because results are rounded to the nearest whole number, some totals may appear inconsistent.

¹ Country surveyed the same cohort of students but at the beginning of the next school year.

[†] Met guidelines for sampling participation rates only after replacement schools were included.

■ Gender difference statistically significant at the 0.05 level

(Frailon et al 2012: ICCS 2009 Asian Report Civic knowledge and attitudes among lower-secondary students in five Asian countries)

Table 5: National Percentages for Students' agreement with Statements about the Role of the Government in Society

Country	Percentages of Students Strongly Agreeing or Agreeing That:					
	The government should take care of its people the way parents take care of their children.			It is the role of the government to promote people's religious or spiritual life.		
Chinese Taipei	95	(0.4)	△	71	(0.8)	△
Indonesia	96	(0.3)	△	92	(0.6)	▲
Korea, Republic of ¹	86	(0.5)	▽	23	(0.6)	▼
Thailand [†]	93	(0.4)		94	(0.5)	▲
ICCS Asian average	92	(0.2)		70	(0.3)	

Country not meeting sampling requirements

Hong Kong SAR	89	(0.8)		47	(1.4)	
---------------	----	-------	--	----	-------	--

National percentage

▲ More than 10 percentage points above ICCS Asian average

△ Significantly above ICCS Asian average

▼ More than 10 percentage points below ICCS Asian average

▽ Significantly below ICCS Asian average

Notes:

() Standard errors appear in parentheses. Because results are rounded to the nearest whole number, some totals may appear inconsistent.

¹ Country surveyed the same cohort of students but at the beginning of the next school year.

[†] Met guidelines for sampling participation rates only after replacement schools were included.

(Frailon et al 2012: ICCS 2009 Asian Report Civic knowledge and attitudes among lower-secondary students in five Asian countries)

Table 6: National Percentages for Students' Agreement with Statements about the Preservation of Traditional Culture

Table 5.1: National percentages for students' agreement with statements about the preservation of traditional culture

Country	Percentages of Students Strongly Agreeing or Agreeing That:			
	I would like to have more opportunities to learn about <country of test>'s traditional culture.	<Country of test> needs to maintain its unique cultural identity against the influence of other cultures.	Because <country of test>'s culture represents our cultural heritage, all parts of our traditional culture should be preserved.	I feel responsible for preserving <country of test>'s traditional culture.
Chinese Taipei	93 (0.4)	79 (0.7) ▽	91 (0.5) ▽	91 (0.5) ▽
Indonesia	98 (0.3) △	95 (0.5) △	96 (0.4) △	96 (0.4) △
Korea, Republic of ¹	82 (0.6) ▼	73 (0.6) ▼	87 (0.5) ▽	87 (0.5) ▽
Thailand †	98 (0.2) △	96 (0.4) △	96 (0.4) △	96 (0.4) △
ICCS Asian average	93 (0.2)	86 (0.3)	93 (0.2)	93 (0.2)
Country not meeting sampling requirements				
Hong Kong SAR	87 (0.8)	80 (1.0)	90 (0.8)	90 (0.8)

National percentage

▲ More than 10 percentage points above ICCS Asian average

▼ More than 10 percentage points below ICCS Asian average

△ Significantly above ICCS Asian average

▽ Significantly below ICCS Asian average

Notes:

() Standard errors appear in parentheses. Because results are rounded to the nearest whole number, some totals may appear inconsistent.

¹ Country surveyed the same cohort of students but at the beginning of the next school year.

† Met guidelines for sampling participation rates only after replacement schools were included.

(Frailon et al 2012: ICCS 2009 Asian Report Civic knowledge and attitudes among lower-secondary students in five Asian countries)

Table 7: National Percentages for Students' Agreement with Statements about Corruption in Public Service

Country	Percentages of Students Strongly Agreeing or Agreeing That:		
	It is acceptable to bribe government officials to get things done effectively.	It doesn't matter if a public official uses resources from the institution where he/she works for his/her personal benefit.	Preventing corruption is adults' business; it has nothing to do with me.
Chinese Taipei	10 (0.5) ▼	18 (0.6) ▼	11 (0.5) ▼
Indonesia	30 (1.5)	35 (1.4) △	47 (1.4) ▲
Korea, Republic of ¹	8 (0.4) ▼	13 (0.6) ▼	12 (0.6) ▼
Thailand †	71 (1.2) ▲	48 (1.3) ▲	49 (1.4) ▲
ICCS Asian average	30 (0.5)	28 (0.5)	30 (0.5)

Country not meeting sampling requirements

Hong Kong SAR	11 (1.1)	17 (1.4)	17 (1.0)
---------------	----------	----------	----------

National percentage

▲ More than 10 percentage points above ICCS Asian average

▼ More than 10 percentage points below ICCS Asian average

△ Significantly above ICCS Asian average

▽ Significantly below ICCS Asian average

Notes:

() Standard errors appear in parentheses. Because results are rounded to the nearest whole number, some totals may appear inconsistent.

¹ National Desired Population does not cover all of International Desired Population.

† Met guidelines for sampling participation rates only after replacement schools were included.

(Frailon et al 2012: ICCS 2009 Asian Report Civic knowledge and attitudes among lower-secondary students in five Asian countries)

Table 8: National Percentages for Students' Agreement with Statements about the Preservation of Traditional Culture

Country	Percentages of Students Strongly Agreeing or Agreeing That:				
	Even if you have a different opinion, you should always follow the advice of elders when making important decisions.	Even if you have a different opinion, you should always follow the advice of the people with the highest-status position when making important decisions.	Even if you have a different opinion, you should always obey your teachers.	Classmates or colleagues should not argue with each other, to maintain social harmony.	Even if you have a different opinion, you should always obey your parents.
Chinese Taipei	68 (0.7)	35 (0.7) ▼	44 (0.8) ▼	81 (0.6) ▽	55 (0.8) ▼
Indonesia	78 (1.0) △	48 (1.4)	83 (0.8) ▲	96 (0.4) △	92 (0.5) ▲
Korea, Republic of ¹	36 (0.7) ▼	19 (0.7) ▼	22 (0.8) ▼	76 (0.6) ▼	33 (0.9) ▼
Thailand †	93 (0.4) ▲	86 (0.6) ▲	89 (0.6) ▲	94 (0.5) △	95 (0.4) ▲
ICCS Asian average	69 (0.4)	47 (0.5)	60 (0.4)	87 (0.3)	69 (0.3)

Country not meeting sampling requirements

Hong Kong SAR	63 (1.1)	46 (1.1)	54 (1.2)	84 (0.9)	59 (1.1)
---------------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------

National percentage

▲ More than 10 percentage points above ICCS Asian average

▼ More than 10 percentage points below ICCS Asian average

△ Significantly above ICCS Asian average

▽ Significantly below ICCS Asian average

Notes:

() Standard errors appear in parentheses. Because results are rounded to the nearest whole number, some totals may appear inconsistent.

¹ Country surveyed the same cohort of students but at the beginning of the next school year.

† Met guidelines for sampling participation rates only after replacement schools were included.

(Frailon et al 2012: ICCS 2009 Asian Report Civic knowledge and attitudes among lower-secondary students in five Asian countries)

Table 9: National Percentages for Students' Agreement with Statements about Sense of Asian Identity

Country	Percentages of Students Strongly Agreeing or Agreeing That:						
	I think of myself as an Asian citizen	I am proud of the economic progress that has been made across Asia as a whole.	I am proud of being Asian.	I am proud of Asian cultural traditions.	I am proud of the progress of democracy that has been made across Asia as a whole.	I am proud of the progress that has been made in human rights across Asia as a whole.	I feel I have a lot in common with other young people in Asia.
Chinese Taipei	91 (0.5) △	83 (0.6) ▽	84 (0.5) △	87 (0.5)	85 (0.6) ▽	84 (0.6) ▽	83 (0.6) △
Indonesia	72 (1.4) ▼	90 (0.7) △	80 (1.2) ▽	84 (0.9) ▽	85 (1.0) ▽	91 (0.6) △	77 (0.9)
Korea, Republic of ¹	94 (0.3) ▲	84 (0.5) ▽	81 (0.6) ▽	86 (0.6)	85 (0.5) ▽	91 (0.4) △	62 (0.8) ▼
Thailand †	77 (0.9) ▽	92 (0.5) △	85 (0.7) △	88 (0.6) △	95 (0.4) △	93 (0.6) △	85 (0.6) △
ICCS Asian average	83 (0.5)	87 (0.3)	83 (0.4)	86 (0.3)	87 (0.3)	89 (0.3)	77 (0.4)

Country not meeting sampling requirements

Hong Kong SAR	93 (0.7)	85 (1.0)	86 (0.8)	87 (0.9)	84 (0.9)	82 (1.0)	80 (1.0)
---------------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------

National percentage

▲ More than 10 percentage points above ICCS Asian average

▼ More than 10 percentage points below ICCS Asian average

△ Significantly above ICCS Asian average

▽ Significantly below ICCS Asian average

Notes:

() Standard errors appear in parentheses. Because results are rounded to the nearest whole number, some totals may appear inconsistent.

¹ Country surveyed the same cohort of students but at the beginning of the next school year.

† Met guidelines for sampling participation rates only after replacement schools were included.

(Frailon et al 2012: ICCS 2009 Asian Report Civic knowledge and attitudes among lower-secondary students in five Asian countries)

Table 10: Mean Level of Attachment to Asian Values for South Korean Students from the ICCS 2009

	Family– State	Moral– State	Moral Cit.1 ¹	Moral Cit. 2 ²	Social Harmony	Follow Elders	Follow Position	Obey Teachers	Obey Parents
Overall Attachment	3.19	3.17	3.10	3.08	2.88	2.28	2.16	2.00	2.22
<i>SES</i>									
Highest	3.16	3.28*	3.18*	3.05	2.84	2.19*	2.04*	1.93*	2.16*
Upper Middle	3.16	3.18*	3.11*	3.09	2.85	2.22*	2.13*	1.94*	2.21*
Middle	3.20	3.18*	3.07*	3.07	2.90	2.28*	2.18*	2.01*	2.22*
Lower Middle	3.24	3.15*	3.08*	3.07	2.88	2.31*	2.18*	2.01*	2.24*
Lowest	3.20	3.07*	3.08*	3.10	2.92	2.38*	2.24*	2.08*	2.29*
<i>Gender</i>									
Female	3.16	3.22*	3.11	3.05	2.83*	2.23*	2.07*	1.93*	2.13*
Male	3.18	3.13*	3.10	3.09	2.92*	2.31*	2.23*	2.05*	2.3*

Note. *p < 0.01, Items range from 1–4 with 4 indicating greater attachment.

1. A person who obeys the law but does not behave morally is not a good citizen.

2. One can only be a good citizen if one is a good moral person.

(Knowles, Ryan T., 2015: Asian values and democratic citizenship)

Table 11: Response to Conceptions of a Good Citizen among Youth in Indonesia

A Good Citizen	Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree
respects the rights of others	0.8	1.1	4.7	49.4	44
obeys the law	0.6	1.8	9.7	43.5	44.6
tries to obtain more rights for people	0.7	4.4	16.3	49.5	29.1
tries to change unfair laws	1.1	5.5	20.6	44.3	28.5
knows about government policies	1.5	8	20.1	57.1	13.3
puts national interests above personal	2.4	8.6	29.6	40.1	19.4
carefully evaluates and criticizes government policies	1.4	9.5	28.8	45.8	14.6
participates actively in local community groups	1	10.7	27	52.3	8.9
takes part in political activities	3.5	29.2	45.1	19.6	2.7

(Liem and MacInerney, 2010: Indonesian Students and their Citizenship-Related Attributes)

Table 12: Ten Most Important Aspects of Civic Awareness as Expressed by Beijing Students

Rank	Civic awareness	Mean ^a	Domain
1	Behaving responsibly	3.8013	Personal-social domain
2	Strengthening my confidence	3.7958	Personal-social domain
3	I have great love for China	3.7746	National domain
4	I am proud of China's traditional culture	3.7690	National domain
5	I remain solemn during national flag raising ceremonies	3.7636	National domain
6	Terrorism is never justified	3.7632	Global domain
7 =	I am proud of the scientific and technological achievements of contemporary China	3.7586	National domain
7 =	I am proud of Beijing's traditional cultures	3.7586	Local domain
9	Accepting someone of a different race or ethnicity as a friend	3.7582	Personal-social domain
10	The cultures of all nations (including China) should be exchanged and learned from	3.7560	Global domain

^a 1 = not at all important/strongly disagree to 4 = very important/strongly agree.

(Pan, Su-Yan, 2011: *Multileveled citizenship and citizenship education*)

Table 13: Ten Least Important Aspects of Civic Awareness as Expressed by Beijing Students

Rank	Civic awareness	Mean ^a	Domain
1	I would prefer to live permanently in another country (than China)	2.5823	National domain
2	I would prefer to live permanently in another city (than Beijing) in China	2.5889	Local domain
3	The state should set the local development of Beijing as a top priority	3.0689	Local domain
4	In national meetings, other areas in China should take heed of Beijing's view	3.1029	Local domain
5	The world would be a better place if citizens of other countries were like citizens of China	3.1245	National domain
6	China would be a better place if citizens from other cities were like citizens of Beijing	3.1975	Local domain
7	Generally speaking, Beijing is a better city than most other cities in China	3.2301	Local domain
8	I am more concerned with the development of Beijing than with that of China	3.2377	Local domain
9	Generally speaking, China is a better country than most other countries in the world	3.2546	National domain
10	It does not matter to me where I live in the world	3.2895	Global domain

^a 1 = not at all important/strongly disagree to 4 = very important/strongly agree.

(Pan, Su-Yan, 2011: *Multileveled citizenship and citizenship education*)

Table 14: Means of Importance of Civic Awareness in Selected Aspects as Expressed by Beijing Students


Civic awareness	Mean ^b	Domain
Developing healthy character and life habits	3.7495	Personal-social domain
Studying hard	3.7007	
Managing time well	3.6271	
Controlling my emotions well	3.7345	
Enhancing my self-esteem	3.7217	
Queuing up to take public buses or buy tickets	3.7577	
Helping someone new to feel at home	3.4795	
Helping someone who is less well off than me	3.3156	
Listening to someone else's point of view	3.7163	
I am proud to live in Beijing	3.5910	
I care about Beijing's developments	3.5533	
I am proud of my local (i.e. Beijing) identity	3.5935	
The national flag of China is very important to me	3.7308	National domain
I am willing to attend national flag raising ceremonies	3.7175	
I am proud to live in China	3.6951	
I have great care for China	3.7234	Global domain
I am proud of my national identity	3.7051	
The flag of the United Nations is very important to me	3.4695	
I am willing to participate in activities promoting world peace	3.7441	
I am willing to participate in activities promoting environment protection throughout the world	3.7433	
I care about peace in the world	3.7478	
I am proud to be a citizen of the world	3.7321	
I am willing to improve my proficiency in foreign language(s) to communicate better with foreigners	3.7437	

^a Only items used in this article are displayed here.

^b 1 = not at all important/strongly disagree to 4 = very important/strongly agree.


(Pan, Su-Yan, 2011: *Multileveled citizenship and citizenship education.*)

Figure ABS1: Pride in the Government System




(Park, Chong Min, 2012: *The Youth's Evaluations of Quality of Governance in East Asia*)

Figure UNDP1: Understanding of Democracy among East and South East Asian Youth




(UNDP, 2014a: Youth and Democratic Citizenship in East and South-East Asia)

Figure UNDP2: Psychological Involvement in Politics by Cohort




(UNDP, 2014a: Youth and Democratic Citizenship in East and South-East Asia)

Figure UNDP3: Social Trust by Cohort (selected countries)




(UNDP, 2014a: Youth and Democratic Citizenship in East and South-East Asia)

Figure UNDP4: Lobbying and Activism by Cohort



(UNDP, 2014a: Youth and Democratic Citizenship in East and South-East Asia)


Figure UNDP5: Attitudes towards Civic Engagement among Cambodian Youth



Q: Now I would like to ask your opinion of young people's participation. When I refer to young people I mean people in Cambodia between the ages of 15 and 24. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(UNDP, 2014b: Reaching and Engaging the Cambodian Youth on Issues of Civic Participation)

Figure UNDP6: Reason for Voting among Cambodian Youth




Base: Respondents who voted in the national election (n=1,056) or the local election (627).

Q: What was the main reason that you did vote in the National Assembly elections last month/local (commune/sangkat) elections last year?

(UNDP, 2014b: Reaching and Engaging the Cambodian Youth on Issues of Civic Participation)

Figure UNDP7: Priority Concerns among Cambodian Youth



Base: All respondents (n=2,597)

Q: In your opinion, what are the main issues affecting people in Cambodia at present?

Q: Of the issues you have just mentioned, which one is most important to you?

Q: And now thinking about issues affecting people where you currently live, what are the issues of local importance?

Q: Of the issues you have just mentioned, which one is most important to you?

(UNDP, 2014b: Reaching and Engaging the Cambodian Youth on Issues of Civic Participation)